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It Is Statutorily Required that the Buck Stops Here:
Risk Retention Requirements in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
Andrew Bradford*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act" or the "Act") into law in
July of 2010.1 The Dodd-Frank Act gives governmental regulators a
significant increase in the power they can wield over financial services
institutions and, at over 2300 pages long, covers a wide variety of pre-
viously unregulated practices. Title IX, Subtitle D, of the Dodd-Frank
Act seeks to address problems with the asset-backed securitization
process, most notably the creation and sale of a collateralized debt
obligation (CDO). Incredibly complex by design and once seldom
discussed outside the world of structured finance, these CDOs were
thrust into the public consciousness as the "toxic assets" 2 that began
losing tremendous amounts of value in 2007 and precipitated the
global financial crisis. This Comment describes the inherent problems
in the creation and issuance of CDOs backed by subprime mortgages
and examines the measures Congress has taken in an attempt to regu-
late CDO issuance. In addition, this Comment will analyze the Dodd-
Frank Act's potential success or failure as well as the effects it will
have on both governmental enforcement and private litigation against
large financial institutions.3
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, December 2012.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
2. Rivaled perhaps only by "shadow banking system" in terms of popular fear-inducing
catchphrases.
3. It should be noted that, although the concept is inextricably intertwined with the ideas
presented below, this Comment does not address the notion of "too big to fail." While one
might argue that this is the underlying failure and banks simply monetized the problem, this
Comment attempts to address only specific legislation.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Collateralized Debt Obligation Creation and Issuance
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBSs) represent one
type of CDO that has gained considerable attention. RMBSs are
bonds backed by a portfolio of residential mortgage loans that are
tranched into various levels of credit risk.4 Banks were looking for
ways to make profits in an area that became crowded with many other
players that acted as lenders. Banks thought profit could be made
beyond merely the interest on loans. Instead, banks thought they
could divest themselves of the loans' risk, thereby freeing up capital to
use for other ventures.5 This lucrative practice has an obvious advan-
tage-the more capital available for loans, the greater the potential
for profits. With a rapid rise in home ownership, however, many indi-
viduals received mortgages who might not have otherwise qualified
for traditional mortgages; these individuals are known as subprime
borrowers.6
Generally, issuers of subprime mortgages are mortgage banks or
brokers7 who sell their loans to investment banks, as opposed to com-
mercial banks that deal with more traditional mortgages and guaran-
tee their loans through government enterprises.8 The issuer of the
mortgages aggregates many loans issued in a certain geographical area
and subsequently sells these loans to a shell company called a special
purpose entity (SPE) or special purpose vehicle (SPV).9 By using two
tiers of SPEs, the assets move beyond the reach of the originator or its
creditors and thus the structure is considered "bankruptcy remote,"
meaning that if the originator goes bankrupt, the investor's right to
receive payments from the underlying assets will not be affected.10
4. JANET M. TAVAKOLI, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS:
NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN CASH & SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION 2 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2d ed.
2008).
5. Sam Jones, The Formula that Felled Wall St, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2009, 10:04 PM), available
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/912d85e8-2d75-llde-9eba-00144feabdcO.html.
6. Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Law and Economic Issues in Subprime Litigation 8 (Mar. 21, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law,
Economics, & Business). Subprime borrowers typically had a FICO score below 650.
TAVAKOLI, supra note 4, at 155.
7. Bethel et al., supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. Anna K. Barnett-Hart, The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown 5 (Mar. 19, 2009) (unpub-
lished A.B. thesis, Harvard College) (on file with the Department of Economics, Harvard Col-
lege), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edulm-rcbg/students/dunlop/2009-CDOmeltdown.pdf.
10. TAVAKOLI, supra note 4, at 8.
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The first tier is an SPE that is a wholly owned subsidiary of the mort-
gage bank and the second is an independent entity."
After bundling the mortgages into bonds, the SPE resells the prod-
uct, now termed an "asset-backed security," to an underwriting firm,
which in many instances is an in-house operation of a large investment
bank.12 The sale of the securities allows the SPE to purchase addi-
tional loans, and through this arrangement, the process repeats itself.
The investment bank's function is to operate as the "securitizer." It
bundles the bonds once again into a CDO, a process that involves
sorting the bonds into a series of tranches that combine to form the
CDO as a whole.13 A tranche is a slice of the CDO that represents
varied levels of risk corresponding to the likelihood of default on the
loans within that tranche. Tranching creates multiple classes of debt
where banks pay investors in "junior" tranches a higher rate of return
on their investment because they agree to take losses before the se-
nior debt holders, who hold "safer" debt. 14 Additionally, the tranche
system creates a "waterfall," which means that banks pay investors in
the order of the seniority of tranche the investors hold.15 This means
that when defaults occur in any underlying asset, the senior tranches
are the first ones to receive payment, but each tranche's payout is re-
duced by a fraction corresponding to an agreed upon definition in the
security's contractual materials.16 As more and more mortgages de-
fault, the payout will approach zero.
Creating tranches is a way to price securities that may be difficult to
price in their individual forms; it also opens up the loan market to
investors who may not otherwise be able to engage in higher-risk in-
vestments.17 A single loan might have a very high risk of default (and
so naturally, one would be wary of extending credit for this loan), but
in a security composed of many loans, it should become increasingly
unlikely that all will default. Therefore, investors will be willing to
lend to a greater number of people who otherwise might not have
been able to obtain a loan because the investors know that they have a
greater chance of receiving a positive return on their investment.
While the tranches must necessarily contain the underlying risk of the
individual loans, prior to the 2008 crisis, the idea was that some level
11. Id.
12. Id. at 16.
13. Id. at 4.
14. Id. at 120.
15. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2039, 2047 (2007).
16. Id.
17. Jones, supra note 5.
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of diversification was achieved. The belief was that mathematical
models would allow investors to clearly recognize the risk in each
tranche and invest according to their own needs or preferences.' 8 The
models, however, failed to correctly analyze potential losses, a topic
that will be addressed below.
Creating a tranche required the loans to receive a rating from one
of several large credit ratings companies. 19 Standard & Poor's ratings
are as follows, in descending order from perceived lowest to highest
risk: AAA, AA (senior investment grade), A, BBB, BB, B (invest-
ment grade or mezzanine/subprime mezzanine). 20 The ratings scale
continues below B grade, but these bonds are supposed to be located
within an unrated "equity tranche." 2 1 This bottom-rung tranche was
meant to absorb the initial losses in the event of a default and would
often receive only residual cash flow once the other banks had paid
off the other classes. 22 Tranche ratings reflected the quality of the un-
derlying assets, as well as how much cash-flow protection a tranche is
afforded by subordinate tranches.23 Ratings were achieved by analyz-
ing variables such as the diversity of the loans within a tranche, but
not necessarily the actual ability of the individual borrowers to repay
these loans.24 Because no one was expected to buy asset-backed se-
curities by looking at individual loans, CDO buyers ignored the possi-
bility that banks could have issued many of these loans to borrowers
who had no real possibility of repaying them. 2 5
Further complicating the process was the fact that ratings agencies
often did not have their own models for how to properly determine
credit risk in a CDO, all while attempting to rate an enormous amount
of new offerings. Where models did exist, they were often an auto-
mated process with little oversight. 26 Additionally, with the advent of
"CDO squared," ratings agencies would then rely on their own, usu-
ally not fully accurate, ratings on the first level of assets to attempt to
assign a rating for the end product.27 Next, when a bank asked an
18. Id.
19. Moody's and Standard & Poor's controlled the vast majority of the market.
20. Bethel et al., supra note 6, at 9.
21. TAVAKOLI, supra note 4, at 4.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 9.
24. Engel & McCoy, supra note 15, at 2047.
25. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 97 (W. W. Nor-
ton & Co., Inc. 2010) (providing an extreme example in which a bank lent to a migrant straw-
berry picker the full amount needed to purchase a $724,000 house, even though the picker had
an annual income of less than $20,000).
26. Bamett-Hart, supra note 9, at 17.
27. Id. at 20.
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agency to evaluate a product previously rated by a competitor, the
agency would often simply take the rating and decrease it by one
notch with the idea that this practice would safeguard against any po-
tential errors in the first rating process. 28 The process became so con-
voluted that banks often would provide their own rating models and
the agency would rubber stamp the model.29
In the final step, investment banks sold the completed CDOs, and
the securitizer would potentially receive two forms of revenue: cash
from the actual sale and the "excess spread," which is any interest in
excess of that owed to investors.30 The securitizer could capture these
excess spreads by providing "credit enhancement" to the CDO; basi-
cally, through the structure of the CDO, the agencies could give the
senior tranche a higher credit rating because the junior tranches
would suffer the first losses.3' This excess spread was the source of
the majority of profits for securitizers.
B. Later Developments in the Process
So popular were mortgage-backed CDOs that the demand for sub-
prime bonds actually outpaced the supply.32 One way for banks to
sidestep this problem was the creation of "CDO squared" and "CDO
cubed," which repackaged difficult-to-sell mezzanine tranches of al-
ready issued CDOs into completely new products. 33 Through this
process, the rating agencies often similarly rated the CDO squared
across their tranches. The rating agencies, however, ignored the fact
the banks composed the CDO squared of the lower rated tranches
that the banks had difficulty selling in the first instance. 34 An easy
way to think of the situation is to answer this question: What will a
securitizer be left with once a bank had issued a CDO? The answer is
the rejected tranches that received the lowest ratings. These were the
tranches that the banks repackaged into the CDO squared.
Additionally, products known as "synthetic CDOs" allowed inves-
tors to receive cash payments without the need for a physical bor-
rower to buy a house by simply mimicking the performance of actual
mortgaged-backed CDOs.35 This practice was achieved through the
28. Id.
29. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 76.
30. Engel & McCoy, supra note 15, at 2048.
31. ANDREW M. CHISHOLM, DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO FOR-
WARDS, FUTURES, SwAPS, AND OPTIONS 202 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2004).
32. Barnett-Hart, supra note 9, at 10.
33. Id. at 12.
34. Id. at 14.
35. Id. at 13.
272 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 10:267
use of contracts known as credit default swaps, which act like a form
of insurance contract that protects against the default of an asset-
backed security.3 6 A credit protection buyer pays a fee to a seller,
called a credit protection provider, in exchange for a payment if a
"credit event" occurs in the underlying assets.37 In a simplified form,
the entity selling a credit default swap acts as the holder of a mortgage
bond, receiving a certain premium per year for their insurance, while
the investor would receive cash as the actual mortgage is paid off.3 8
Conversely, the investor or entity on the other side of the transaction
gives up that premium in return for the promise that the banks will
compensate the investor should the mortgage default. 39 Credit de-
fault swaps serve as a protection against risk that the entity has al-
ready extended. But with the creation of the synthetic CDO, these
swaps became a way to dramatically increase the market for mort-
gage-backed securities and, as a consequence, dramatically increase
the risk posed by the securities by greatly expanding the market.
Synthetic CDOs also feature a top-level tranche dubbed "super se-
nior," which banks designed as a way to hedge against credit risk in
their loan portfolios. 40 Banks retained the super senior tranches on
their balance sheets as a way to receive cash flow from what they con-
sidered impossible-to-default assets. This would offset any potential
losses from the sale of lower rated tranches. While low-rated tranches
might not default, they would decrease in value and could cause the
bank to experience a loss in value without receiving any insurance
payout for any credit default swap the bank purchased.41 Banks com-
posed super senior tranches of assets similar to AAA tranches; how-
ever, two substantially similar CDOs might contain different sized
super senior tranches without ratings agencies dubbing either an "in-
correct" model.42 This means that one could line up two almost iden-
tical CDOs back-to-back and determine that one contained a greater
percentage of "safe" assets than the other. Furthermore, credit rating
agencies did not officially acknowledge the existence of super senior
tranches and would again often simply rely on banks' models for de-
termining creditworthiness.43 In combination, both variants on the
36. Id.
37. TAVAKOLI, supra note 4, at 47.
38. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 75.
39. Id.
40. TAVAKOLI, supra note 4, at 331.
41. Felix Salmon, What's a Super-Senior Tranche?, PORTFOLIO (Dec. 1, 2008, 9:25 PM), http://
www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/12/01/whats-a-super-senior-tranchel.
42. TAVAKOLI, supra note 4, at 332.
43. Id. at 333.
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traditional CDO allowed securitizers to introduce to the market and
to their own balance sheets a tremendous amount of subprime risk
that very few people thoroughly understood.44
Taken together, the creation of mortgage-backed CDOs in the years
1997 through 2006, when real housing prices in the United States rose
about five percent per year, created substantial problems and risks. 45
The underlying loans were often of poor quality and the structure of
CDOs allowed risks to be hidden or glossed over. Also, CDO deriva-
tives over-leveraged the amount of risk in the market, and institutions
bought CDOs without understanding the risks they contained. Fi-
nally, ratings agencies approved classifications that had very little rela-
tion to the actual quality of the product. When this house of cards
came crashing down, first silently in 2007, then with a bang in 2008,
many began to attempt the difficult process of sifting through the
murky world of CDOs and regulating the creation and issuing
processes.
III. THE DODD-FRANK ACT
Introduced in late 2009 by Representative Barney Frank46 and Sen-
ator Christopher Dodd, 47 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010.48 Title
IX, Subtitle D, of the Act is entitled "Improvements to the Asset-
Backed Securitization Process." 49 Section 941 proposes that this Sub-
title amend Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
Act defines an originator as a person who "(A) through the extension
of credit or otherwise, creates a financial asset that collateralizes an
asset-backed security; and (B) sells an asset directly or indirectly to a
securitizer."50 The Act defines a securitizer as "an issuer of an asset-
44. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 143 (indicating that the creation of the synthetic CDO was re-
quired by the simple fact that there were not enough Americans taking out loans to supply
investors' demand for actual mortgage-backed CDOs).
45. Bethel et al., supra note 6, at 17.
46. House Representative Barney Frank is a democrat representing the State of Massachu-
setts and was the Chairman of House Financial Services Committee from 2007-2011. Biographi-
cal Directory of the United States Congress: FRANK, Barney, (1940 -), CONGRESS.Gov, http://bio
guide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=f000339 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
47. Mr. Dodd was a democratic Senator for Connecticut and was the Chairman of Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs from 2007 until 2011. History of Chairmen
of the Senate Banking Committee, SENATE BANKING COMMITTEE, http://banking.senate.gov/
public/ files/ChairmenoftheSenateBankingCommittee.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
48. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
49. Id. sec. 941(a), § 3(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (Supp. 2010)).
50. Id. sec. 941(b), § 15G(a)(4)(A)-(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(a)(4)(A)-(B) (Supp.
2010)).
274 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 10:267
backed security" or "a person who organizes and initiates an asset-
backed securities transaction by selling or transferring assets, either
directly or indirectly, including through an affiliate, to the issuer.""5
The main focus of section 941 is the risk-retention requirement.
The Act requires that any securitizer must retain an economic interest
in "a portion of the credit risk for any residential mortgage asset that
the securitizer, through the issuance of an asset-backed security, trans-
fers, sells, or conveys to a third party."5 2 The amount of risk that
banks must retain is at least five percent of the credit risk to any asset
in an asset-backed security that is not a qualified residential mort-
gage.53 The same is true if the asset is securitized with assets that are
not qualified residential mortgages. 54 Additionally, the section pro-
hibits the securitizer from hedging or transferring the required
amount of retained credit risk.55
The Act additionally recognizes that further rulemaking will be re-
quired to determine how to allocate risk retention requirements be-
tween securitizers and originators. 56 The Act provides that federal
banking agencies must
(1) reduce the percentage of risk retention obligations required of
the securitizer by the percentage of risk retention obligations
required of the originator; and
(2) consider-
(A) whether the assets sold to the securitizer have terms, con-
ditions, and characteristics that reflect low credit risk;
(B) whether the form or volume of transactions in securitiza-
tion markets creates incentives for imprudent origination
of the type of loan or asset to be sold to the securitizer; and
(C) the potential impact of the risk retention obligations on the
access of consumers and businesses to credit on reasonable
terms, which may not include the transfer of credit risk to a
third party.57
This provision suggests that a securitizer may be able to escape its
duty to retain risk if the originator is already retaining risk itself. For
reasons discussed later in this Comment, this reading of the statute
may prove problematic. Additionally, the language in subsection
(2)(B) may be especially important because a large force driving the
51. Id. sec. 941(b), § 15G(a)(3)(A)-(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(a)(3)(A)-(B) (Supp.
2010)).
52. Id. sec. 941, § 15G(b)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(b)(2) (Supp. 2010)).
53. This phrase is defined in the next paragraph.
54. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 941(b), § 15G(c)(1)(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)
(Supp. 2010)).
55. Id. sec. 941(b), § 15G(c)(1)(A) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(A) (Supp. 2010)).
56. Id. sec. 941(b), § 15G(c)(1)(F) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(F) (Supp. 2010)).
57. Id. sec. 941(b), § 15G(d)(1)-(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(d)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2010)).
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creation of subprime-backed CDOs was the appetite of investment
banks for these types of instruments.
The Act modifies the risk retention requirement by allowing HUD
and the FHA to define and exempt "qualified residential mort-
gages." 58 These mortgages are ones that historical loan performance
data should indicate contain a lower risk of default.59 Lower risk will
be determined by "documentation and verification of the financial re-
sources relied upon to qualify the mortgagor" 60 and standards such as:
(I) the residual income of the mortgagor after all monthly
obligations;
(II) the ratio of the housing payments of the mortgagor to the
monthly income of the mortgagor;
(III) the ratio of total monthly installment payments of the mortga-
gor to the income of the mortgagor .... 61
In essence, a borrower who receives a clean bill of health under
these factors will be one who would have received a traditional, as
opposed to subprime, loan in the past. As described previously, com-
mercial banks generally provided these types of loans and the govern-
ment insured the loans. While these loans were in the CDO pools as
well, their credit-worthiness would potentially allow them to stand on
their own without the need for securitization. Additionally, the Act
looks beyond the individual borrower to aspects of the loan itself,
such as:
(iii) mitigating the potential for payment shock on adjustable rate
mortgages through product features and underwriting
standards;
(iv) mortgage guarantee insurance or other types of insurance or
credit enhancement obtained at the time of origination, to the
extent such insurance or credit enhancement reduces the risk
of default; and
(v) prohibiting or restricting the use of balloon payments, nega-
tive amortization, prepayment penalties, interest-only pay-
ments, and other features that have been demonstrated to
exhibit a higher risk of borrower default.62
Thus, like the provisions addressing the borrowers themselves, the
Act attempts to restrict or prohibit particularly risky types of loans.
58. Id. sec. 941(b), § 15G(e)(4) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(4) (Supp. 2010)).
59. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 941(b), § 15G(e)(4)(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(4)(B)
(Supp. 2010)).
60. Id. sec. 941(b), § 15G(e)(4)(B)(i) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(4)(B)(i) (Supp.
2010)).
61. Id. sec. 941(b), § 15G(e)(4)(B)(i)(I)-(III) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(4)(B)(ii)
(I)-(III) (Supp. 2010)).
62. Id. sec. 941(b), § 15G(e)(4)(B)(iii)-(v) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(4)(B)(iii)-(v)
(Supp. 2010)).
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Such loans feature balloon payments, negative amortization, or inter-
est-only payments, which are often features of subprime mortgages,
and almost always feature an adjustable rate. 63 Many of these mort-
gages can contain considerable danger to a borrower, especially when
the borrower may not realistically be able to make payments on such
a loan. For example, a "hybrid adjustable rate mortgage" has a low
fixed rate for an initial period (perhaps a year or two), then resets
every six months beyond that based on a benchmark interest rate.64
These subsequent rates are often much higher than the ones during
the initial period. A particularly hazardous mortgage called an "inter-
est-only negative-amortizing adjustable-rate subprime mortgage" 65 al-
lows a borrower to roll over any interest payments owed into a higher
principle balance. 66 All of these are now under greater scrutiny.
Section 942 of the Act also requires that issuers of asset-backed se-
curities disclose loan or asset-level data by stating that the Commis-
sion shall
(A) set standards for the format of the data provided by issuers of
an asset-backed security, which shall, to the extent feasible, fa-
cilitate comparison of such data across securities in similar
types of asset classes; and
(B) require issuers of asset-backed securities, at a minimum, to dis-
close asset-level or loan-level data, if such data are necessary
for investors to independently perform due diligence, includ-
ing-
(i) data having unique identifiers relating to loan brokers or
originators;
(ii) the nature and extent of the compensation of the broker
or originator of the assets backing the security; and
(iii) the amount of risk retention by the originator and the
securitizer of such assets. 67
These disclosure requirements are intended to assist investors' due
diligence reviews, but the Act further requires that the SEC issue
rules requiring issuers of asset-backed securities to conduct and dis-
close the results of their own review of the underlying assets in an
asset-backed security.68
63. Bethel et al., supra note 6, at 8.
64. Id.
65. If an acronym for this exists, it is seldom, if ever, seen.
66. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 28 ("It wasn't hard to see what sort of person might like to have
such a loan: one with no income.").
67. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 942(b), § (c)(2)(A)-(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c)(2)(A)-(B)
(Supp. 2010)).
68. Memorandum from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, L.L.P., The Dodd-Frank Act:
Significant Impact on Public Companies 9 (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.skadden.comle
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Taken as a whole, the Act addresses many key problems, yet leaves




In large part, beyond the failings of the instruments themselves, a
lack of risk retention contributed to the severity of the mortgage cri-
sis. Many authors have suggested that credit derivatives changed the
traditional notion of how the banking system worked. 69 While at one
time banks would need to meet with and evaluate the party on the
other side of the transaction to determine whether the investment was
sound, derivatives squashed this antiquated notion.70 With deriva-
tives, it did not matter if the loans were bad or not because the banks
could trade the risk away. While increasing risk retention is at the
heart of the Act, once one gets beyond the philosophical underpin-
nings of how the banking system should work, several problems arise
in the Act's language.
Risk retention is important because it is tied to how much capital a
bank must keep on its balance sheet. Risk retention reserves, in the
end, determine what percentage of a bank's debts can be paid with
short-term assets. The large banks all owe each other tremendous
amounts of money and so on down the line until it becomes clear why
"systemic risk" is such a concerning phrase. The impact of large insti-
tutions entering bankruptcy and the corresponding fears that the
banks will not repay their debts are all too vividly etched into the
minds of investors and the public at large after the events of 2008.
Requirements seeking to minimize the impact of risk have been
around for some time. For example, the "G-10" nations, as well as
Spain, signed the Basel I Accord in 1988.71 Basel I required banks to
hold capital equal to eight percent of their risk-weighted assets.72
Banks did not like these rules because any capital that they needed to
retain was capital that they could not use for additional, hopefully lu-
images/TheDodd-FrankActSignificantImpact-onPublicCompanies.pdf [hereinafter Skad-
den Memorandum].
69. See JOHN CASSIDY, How MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES 256 (Pic-
ador 2010); JoHN LANCHESTER, I.O.U.: WHY EVERYONE OWES EVERYONE AND No ONE CAN
PAY 122 (Simon & Schuster 2010).
70. Id.
71. Bryan J. Balin, Basel I, Basel II, and Emerging Markets 1 (May 10, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Stud-
ies), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/11484.pdf.
72. Id. at 3.
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crative, investments and loans.73 The early forms of CDOs were ex-
plicit attempts by banks to circumnavigate the rules.74 With this as an
overarching consideration, the language used in the Act must be ana-
lyzed for any loopholes, as banks will certainly be doing.
As mentioned above, one of the more critical provisions in the Act
that requires clarification is that of a "securitizer." The Act language
uses "seuritizer" in two different ways.
1. Securitizer as an Issuer of an Asset-backed Security
The first definition of securitizer, "an issuer of an asset-backed se-
curity," would seem to logically suggest that this refers to SPVs or
SPEs.75 A crucial step in the chain of CDO creation is the SPV. Orig-
inators construct SPVs primarily as shell companies that are supposed
to protect investors by being bankruptcy-remote from the origina-
tors.7 6 By buying and selling the underlying assets, the SPVs are tech-
nically "off balance sheet" in that, legally, the assets are owned by the
SPV, not the bank.77 This is, of course, one of the SPV's many legal
fictions. Even though the originator should not have access to the
assets, the disposition of the assets is more often than not dictated by
the entity that structured the SPV.78 Originators still oversee the as-
sets, but in an ideal world, the originators have removed all the risk by
selling off the assets through the SPVs. 79 This is illustrated by the very
first credit default swap, J.P. Morgan's 1997 "Broad Indexed Secured
Trust Offering" (BISTRO): the bank actually sliced up the SPV into
tranches, against which it then sold insurance contracts.80 Thus, origi-
nators can claim to have divested themselves of the assets, and theo-
retically the risk as well, without this actually being the reality of the
situation.
Another legal fiction of the SPVs is their very existence. The SPVs
exist solely as a dumping ground for the underlying assets and in many
cases, though technically independent entities, the parent company is
73. LANCHESTER, supra note 69, at 67.
74. Id. at 68.
75. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec.
941(b), § 15G(a)(3)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1891 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(a)(3)(A)
(Supp. 2010)).
76. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 4.
77. CASSIDY, supra note 69, at 272.
78. TAVAKOLI, supra note 4, at 10.
79. CASSIDv, supra note 69, at 272.
80. Jesse Eisinger, The $58 Trillion Elephant in the Room, PORTFOLIO (Oct. 15, 2008), http://
www.portfolio.com/views/columns/wall-street/2008/10/15/Credit-Derivatives-Role-in-Crash/
index2.html.
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still attached to them economically.8' To assuage investors' concerns
about buying assets from these unknown companies, banks gave the
SPVs guaranteed credit lines: the ability to access the banks' capital at
will.82 Lastly, an eccentricity of SPVs is that the "liquidity facilities"-
basically the way the banks' credit lines reached the SPVs-were sur-
prisingly ephemeral creatures. Because the timing of various cash
flows was not perfectly in sync, banks used these liquidity facilities as
a protection against the risk contained in the assets in the SPV.83 But
the aforementioned Basel regulations on capital requirements applied
to any credit line in existence for one year or more.84 However, banks
circumvented this requirement by simply engineering the liquidity fa-
cilities to exist for 364 days, at which point the banks paid a fee to
renew them.85
Thus, the realities of SPVs mean that any risk retention rule apply-
ing solely to them would be meaningless. On one hand, by buying the
underlying assets, the SPVs already technically contain all the risk.
On the other hand, the risk retained by these vehicles did not remain
in them. When a bank offers the SPVs temporary, yet unlimited
credit lines, they are still responsible for any losses that may occur.
For instance, losses might occur when one party is unable to pay due
to defaulting mortgages and when another party is unwilling to pay
due to its own liquidity concerns. Further, if banks can avoid existing
capital requirements due to the short duration of the vehicles, requir-
ing risk retention solves nothing. The risk already exists. Before the
financial meltdown, banks simply were not forced to compensate for
its presence. Now, any change in the use or control of SPVs would
seem to come about by economic necessity, not regulatory interven-
tion. When banks realized how unstable SPVs actually were, it was in
their own best interest to cease or seriously reevaluate the practice.
One final note on how a purely SPV-based risk retention requirement
is meaningless: as of this writing, none currently exist. The final SPV
to close, "Sigma Finance," was shut down in 2008 when J.P. Morgan
81. Id.
82. Id. As Cassidy remarks of the double standard, "[shell companies] were still attached to
their parents, like well-to-do college students." CASSIDY, supra note 69, at 272.
83. TAVAKOLI, supra note 4, at 38.
84. LANCHESTER, supra note 69, at 120.
85. TAVAKOLI, supra note 4, at 38.
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cut off its credit line. 86 The manager of that SPV was a group called
Gordian Knot, a wonderfully appropriate name. 7
2. Securitizer as a Person Who Organizes Transactions
The second definition of "securitizer" in the Act is "a person who
organizes and initiates an asset-backed securities transaction by selling
or transferring assets, either directly or indirectly, including through
an affiliate, to the issuer."88 This would seem to apply the definition
to originators, a term commonly applied to the large investment banks
that created the CDO process. At a base level, originators of asset-
backed securities profit more from the quantity of the underlying
loans than anything else, which provides an incentive to push through
more loans. The sale of CDOs was not the main objective of origina-
tors; rather, the real money was in the fees they could charge custom-
ers by acting as the intermediary.8 9 Indeed, so many CDOs were sold
that the returns offered to investors to accept the extra risk actually
decreased. This was illustrated towards the end of the vast, failed ex-
periment: "[in] 2003, the yield on subprime RMBSs was two to three
percentage points higher than the rate on prime RMBSs: from
2004-2006, the gap fell to one to two percentage points." 90
Additionally, many originators purposely retained tranches of the
CDOs they had created. Through its language, the Act prevents some
of these actions, but is possibly inapplicable to others. An originator
might have kept some of the super senior tranches on their books late
in the game because there simply was not a market for them.91 When
the yield on the subprime mortgages dropped between 2004 and 2006,
the banks, instead of reducing the output of CDO sales, continued the
steady supply and simply retained the super senior tranches because
the yield, and therefore the investors' demand, was reduced.92 In
some instances, individual banks ended up retaining more than fifty
billion dollars worth of these tranches.93 Similarly, as noted above,
banks retained the tranches willingly because they were considered a
86. Gwen Robinson, Sigma Collapse Marks End of SIV Era, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2008, 5:43
AM), available at http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2008/10/02/16576/sigma-collapse-marks-end-of-
siv-eral.
87. Id.
88. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec.
941(b), § 15G(a)(3)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1891 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(a)(3)(B)
(Supp. 2010)).
89. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 215.
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source of stable income. 94 Once again, banks were already thinking
about risk retention and capital requirements. Through credit default
swaps,95 a bank could supposedly eliminate any risk present in the
senior tranches and wind up, in effect, holding only the "safe" super
senior tranches.96 The banks considered these tranches to be so safe
that a bank could declare itself fully hedged even if it had sold off all
the senior tranches and retained only the super seniors. 97 After all,
these were "risk-free" tranches. When a bank was fully hedged
against any risk and yet still enjoying profits from the super senior
tranches, this was indeed optimal because it could make an arbitrage
profit.98
A further practice of banks, often arising out of necessity, was to
retain the equity tranches of a CDO. 99 A common scenario, because a
bank would in effect choose the assets that made up a CDO, would be
to retain this tranche because it would suffer the first losses. Theoreti-
cally, if a bank had its own money and reputation at stake, it might be
more careful selecting the underlying assets than it would other-
wise. 10o As one commentator explains,
[T]he equity tranche bears a large share of the CDO's risk but only
a small share of the notional exposure amount. When a bank trans-
fers credits from its balance sheet into a CDO but retains the equity
tranche, it has transferred nearly all of the notional exposure but
much less than all of the credit risk. Banks often did such balance
sheet CDOs where equity tranche risk was retained, especially in
the early days of the credit derivatives market (late 1990s), but
some market participants may not have understood that the amount
94. Salmon, supra note 41.
95. Recall from above that credit default swaps act as a sort of insurance agreement, with
periodic payments going to one party in exchange for a large, lump sum payment in the event of
a default on the underlying assets. Of course the tranches were still on the books, but the
thought was that the risk had been passed along to another party. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 4,
at 47.
96. Salmon, supra note 41.
97. Id. (indicating that the banks were not, as it happened, fully hedged; however, the prevail-
ing theory at the time was that the number of mortgages needed to default before the super
senior tranches lost value could never happen).
98. Id. Arbitrage describes a transaction that produces theoretically risk-free profits by taking
advantage of a mispricing in a market or between two markets. CHISHOLM, supra note 31, at 4.
99. Recall that the equity tranches receive the lowest payment priority and, even before the
mortgage crisis, were not considered "investment grade" securities. See Bethel et al., supra note
6, at 10.
100. Michael S. Gibson, Understanding the Risk of Synthetic CDOs 17 (July 2004) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with the Federal Reserve Board Trading Risk Analysis Section, Divi-
sion of Research and Statistics), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/2004
36/200436pap.pdf.
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of risk transfer occurring in these transactions was smaller than the
notional amounts involved may have suggested.101
By the nature of its construction, a CDO cannot contain an equal
level of risk across its tranches; if it did, the "waterfall" payout model
would not work because the primary purpose of the model was to
allow the pricing of tranches based on preference for differing levels
of risk. Basically, the equity tranche must contain, at least in a perfect
world, a large amount of the total risk the CDO is carrying.
Another upside for banks was what could be accomplished with the
problematic assets of previously issued CDOs. Through a repack-
aging process, the banks could use tranches composed of what was
supposed to be triple-B rated assets and create a completely new
CDO.102 Despite the level of care that ratings agencies such as
Moody's and Standard & Poor's were supposed to exercise, banks dis-
covered that through reclassifying the loans, anytime a CDO was run
through a rating agency's models, it would come out rated as if it were
composed of about eighty percent triple-A bonds. 103 This meant that
the banks could simply repackage any assets that otherwise did not
appeal to investors into new CDOs, thus selling triple-B bonds for
triple-A prices, the above-described CDO squared. 104
B. Upsides and Downsides
In one area, the Act addresses very real concerns: it most notably
prohibits banks from hedging or transferring any of the five percent of
the risk that they are required to retain.105 This is a sensible, if unwel-
come, rule for two reasons. First, as demonstrated, the banks might
not be effectively hedging their risk, despite their best belief. This
ineffective hedging would become a moot point, since assumptions or
speculation about which assets carry risk would no longer be a factor.
When the financial instruments are so lacking in transparency, often
by design or deceit, it seems much safer to assume that the possibility
exists of any and all of the mortgages defaulting. Second, hedging risk
does not eliminate risk; rather, hedging merely reduces it, often by
transferring the risk to another party. Once again, without trans-
parency, there is a very real chance that such a party does not know
the nature or extent of the risk they are receiving. Thus, the five-
101. Id.
102. LEWIs, supra note 25, at 129.
103. Id. at 140.
104. Id.
105. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec.
941(b), § 15G(c)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1892 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)
(Supp. 2010)).
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percent-retention rule of the Act seeks to address such systemic risk
concerns.
Common sense should dictate, however, that a solution of simply
mandating the retention of five percent of the securitized risk is really
no solution at all. A look at the common practice of retaining the
equity tranches reveals this problem. As mentioned previously, a
CDO attempts to structure the amount of risk in the tranches, with
the intention that the equity tranches carry higher levels of that risk.
When investor sentiment demands it, banks retain these tranches as a
measure of goodwill. What this creates, however, is a situation in
which the bank will already be holding the five percent, or possibly
more. When this risk is on the balance sheets, credit problems like
those experienced in 2007 and 2008 can arise.
The problem becomes even more complex when banks attempt to
hedge their risk. What the Act leaves completely unclear is the use of
the retained risk as collateral. This practice contributes substantial
risk since a bank's inability to repay its own loans on top of the loss of
value in the underlying tranche used as collateral is doubly problem-
atic. Before its demise, Bear Stearns had used an astonishingly simple
method of obtaining capital: it had borrowed money by using the
value of its retained super and super senior tranches as collateral. 106
When the value of the underlying assets started to decline, Bear
Stearns sold the assets at a loss to appease the creditors.107
Another form of effectively using risk as collateral is the "leveraged
super senior trade."108 In this case, investors (usually other banks)
again performed a similar action: loaning money for very short peri-
ods (usually less than ninety days).109 When the borrower is unable to
repay a short-term loan, it is not difficult to see how this type of trade
contributes to systemic risk. The initial bank that provided the loan
would also experience problems with the borrower's lack of liquidity.
These problems spread then to other banks that lent money to the
initial bank, inevitably spreading to the entire banking industry.
Taken together, these loans mean that a borrower already on the los-
ing side of a CDO now has two losses to sustain: that of the actual
CDO and the potential for any loans that they received. Taking into
account the fact that the financial world runs on borrowed money, it is
106. Felix Salmon, Leveraged Super Senior Trades and the Liquidity Put, PoRTFOLLo (Nov. 23,
2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2007/11/23/leveraged-
super-senior-trades-and-the-liquidity-put.
107. Id. (indicating that when the value of the collateral drops below a certain agreed-upon
minimum, the debtor must either increase that collateral somehow or dispose of their position).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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almost inevitable that a bank will have taken out short-term loans.
While these actions are extremely risky, they involve no hedging: the
assets and the risk inherent in them stay squarely on the bank's bal-
ance sheets. The lack of clarity in the Act as to whether this practice
will still be allowed needs to be addressed.
C. Old is New Again: The Return of Due Diligence?
A necessary question at this point is, with all that is now known
about the risks of both the lowest and highest level tranches, what
actual purpose will the risk retention portion of the Act serve?
Before this question is answered, it is worth reviewing the language in
section 942, the other relevant provision of the Act. Section 942 may
contain the most profound, yet useless, requirement in the entire Act.
As stated above, section 942 concerns due diligence, both among in-
vestors and the issuers of the CDOs. The pertinent language, in-
cluded above, broadly requires disclosure of asset or loan-level
information to allow for individual and comparative analysis of the
underlying assets comprising the CDO.n 0 Additionally, the Act re-
quires the banks to conduct their own reviews."' Basically, the Act
now requires both parties in a transaction to understand, or at least
have an opportunity to understand, the risks that their transaction en-
compasses. This seems like such an intuitive concept that legislating
its existence would seem unnecessary if it were not for the years lead-
ing up to the mortgage crisis: the lack of true understanding of the risk
by either party is exactly what caused the crisis.
Without a lengthy tangent into the nature and philosophy of finance
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a brief summary of this period can be
described as this: the cost of borrowing money was low due to low
interest rates, and banks had every incentive to make loans to as many
entities as possible. Following the dot-com bubble, many investors
were shying away from the equity markets and looking for other op-
portunities, specifically, the housing market. Previously, banks simply
made loans to those who seemed to have the ability to repay them.
With the new spike in demand, however, banks began looking to bor-
rowers they previously considered unsuitable for loans. The same
forces that created the CDO generally enabled this trend: structured
finance, or complex mathematical models that allow banks to value,
package, and trade risk rather than retain it themselves.112
110. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec.
942(b), § (c)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1897 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c)(2) (Supp. 2010)).
111. See Skadden Memorandum, supra note 68.
112. See generally Jones, supra note 5.
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RMBSs differ from products composed of things such as corporate
bonds; it is extremely difficult, however, to determine the correlation
of the many loans that make up one of these securities and, therefore,
difficult to predict the likelihood of default of the bonds.x13 This cre-
ates a valuation issue: a buyer wants some idea of the probability of
default. Until 2004, the large ratings agencies had used a "diversity
score" when analyzing CDOs and so several different types of debt,
including the sought-after subprime mortgages, needed to be included
in order to receive a favorable rating.114 Even if not an optimal
method, this at least had the benefit of an actual review of the under-
lying assets. The "diversity" method changed in August of 2004, how-
ever, being replaced with the use of "Gaussian copulas"" 5 by
Moody's and, later, Standard & Poor's.116 Aside from the difficulty,
whether statistics are involved or not, of determining correlation, the
mathematical models suffered a serious flaw: the numbers that the rat-
ing agencies used in the models had very little to do with the realities
of the housing market, often either using information better suited to
traditional mortgage default rates or ignoring historical data alto-
gether. 117 While this is an extremely cursory explanation of what the
process actually entailed, the end result requires no simplification: the
formula created a situation where close to ninety percent of the CDO
tranches rated received a AAA rating."18 In other words, relying on
mathematical formulas, the majority of the financial industry con-
vinced itself that the vast majority of subprime loans were debt as
reliable as United States Treasury bills, supposedly the safest invest-
ment in the world.119
This is why section 942 is important, yet superfluous all at once.
Section 942, if followed, should assist investors when determining the
suitability of the assets in a CDO. A simple reading of the statutory
language gives the impression that the section requires banks to, at a
minimum, compile and provide to investors details of the actual mort-
gages in the CDO. This will theoretically aid in the due diligence pro-
cess, usually thought of as the steps taken to review financial records
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. "Gaussian distribution" is a term for a bell curve, a model that describes random vari-
ables as clustering around a single mean value. Normal Distribution, ENGINEERING STATISTICS
HANDBOOK, http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbookleda/section3/eda3661.htm (last visited Apr.
7, 2011).
116. Jones, supra note 5.
117. LANCHESTER, supra note 69, at 158-63.
118. Id. at 210.
119. Id. at 208.
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or anything deemed material to a sale when purchasing an asset.120 A
large part of the mortgage crisis was a failure of investors to perform
any sort of due diligence, instead relying on the ratings agencies'
flawed mathematical models as the final arbiter of reliability. This
was, however, not because of any real lack of disclosure on the banks'
part. Indeed, the astonishingly small number of investors who not just
predicted, but profited from the collapse of the housing bubble,
shared a common thread: they were some of the only investors to ac-
tually read the prospectus materials and do the credit analysis that
investors should have performed in the first place. 121
The problem with the vast majority of investors is that non-per-
formance of due diligence reviews shows a lack of concern for self-
preservation, rather than mere negligence. This is a flaw that cannot
be simply legislated away. The brief language of this section of the
Act offers nothing to a truly rational actor who would and could have
taken these steps without its assistance. As was seen, however, the
investment community may not have been acting rationally, as often
occurs during a bubble. On the other hand, perhaps following a herd
mentality is a perfectly rational choice. Either way, grave conse-
quences occurred. Now that the banks and investors have learned the
hard lesson and, at least in the collateralized debt world, presumably
taken it to heart, section 942 of the Act's only real purpose is to serve
as a reminder that those who do not learn from history are doomed to
repeat it. While banks and investors should heed this reminder, this
section offers no additional protection. It is difficult to propose alter-
native legislation that would address a due diligence problem that cre-
ates any sort of governmental enforcement mechanism and, as stated
above, it seems unnecessary. On the one hand, the investor may suf-
fer the consequences of his or her actions, so legislating against poor
choices would be an overly paternalistic act. On the other hand, if an
investor were an institutional entity, responsible for the capital of
others, preventing gross oversight would appear to be a simple matter
of contract language between sophisticated parties.
Additionally, the Act states that potential exceptions to the risk re-
tention requirements may be made, provided that they shall
(A) help ensure high quality underwriting standards for the securi-
tizers and originators of assets that are securitized or available for
securitization; and
120. Due Diligence (DD) Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
d/duediligence.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
121. LEwis, supra note 25, at 50.
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(B) encourage appropriate risk management practices by the
securitizers and originators of assets, improve the access of consum-
ers and businesses to credit on reasonable terms, or otherwise be in
the public interest and for the protection of investors. 122
This language is troubling as well because although there were clearly
observable differences in the quality of the CDOs issued by the large
investment banks, the performance of these CDOs did not necessarily
reflect the quality of either the underlying assets or the due diligence
involved in their creation. Banks producing the greatest quantity of
CDOs also produced some of the worst performing ones, suggesting
that perhaps a lack of discrimination in selecting assets caused by a
desire to produce a large volume of products may have exacerbated
the problem.123 However, banks across the board, from the best to
worst performing ones, used the same RMBS suppliers to create their
CDOs.124 Finally, whether or not banks created their own in-house
mortgage originators, in which case one would assume that the addi-
tional knowledge of the loans available might create a more reliable
product, seemed to have no relation to the quality of the CDOs that
were being produced.125 Keeping these factors in mind, the question
becomes, what actions by a bank might receive protection under sec-
tion 941(e)(2) and how would this be measured? Recall that this lan-
guage in the Act does not necessarily refer to just the specific
exception for "qualified residential mortgages" under the same sub-
section, but rather proposes that Congress could grant additional ex-
ceptions. If proper due diligence were being performed, the risk
retention requirement should not require a waiver. In essence, had
the banks conducted the proper work from the beginning, the Act
would exempt the banks from the legislation, thus rewarding the
banks. Even if banks could engage in this practice, would they want
to? "Improving the access of consumers and businesses to credit on
reasonable terms" would imply, with a slightly cynical reading, that
these would refer to just the sort of subprime loans that precipitated
the risk retention requirements in the first place.126 If a bank does not
need to retain that risk, it would necessarily need to be transferred to
122. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec.
941(b), § 15G(e)(2)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1894 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
11(e)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. 2010)).
123. Barnett-Hart, supra note 9, at 92-93.
124. Id. at 93.
125. Id.
126. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 941(b), § 15G(e)(2)(A)-(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(2)
(A)-(B) (Supp. 2010)).
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another party, and what party would now willingly receive that risk?
This is, to say the least, a slightly peculiar provision of the Act.
Viewed in a universal, yet roundabout fashion, mandating risk re-
tention addresses a problem that had been growing for some time.
What remains to be seen is whether the Act will require banks to go
above and beyond the measures they themselves would have taken in
the fallout of the credit crisis. Further, it is not fully clear how future
securitization processes will resemble past ones. The Act may be busy
outlawing practices that will not be occurring in the future.
D. Miscellaneous Worries
One can only hypothesize as to what actual effects the Act will
bring about. Federal agencies will soon put an end to the sort of lin-
guistic speculation that this Comment puts forth. Apart from any sea
change that the Act may, or may not, bring to the financial system,
scholars often discussed two related issues. Though examined only in
passing, these questions are what the practical effect of the Act will be
on litigation and what might possible alternatives to regulatory legisla-
tion resemble.
The Act is too recent to have spawned any litigation, as federal
agencies have not yet adopted its provisions. However, a quick exam-
ination of previous CDO litigation may be helpful in determining
what changes the Act may accomplish. One recent, and notorious,
example of a CDO-related lawsuit was the 2010 Securities and Ex-
change Commission case against Goldman Sachs. The SEC alleged
that a Goldman Sachs personnel defrauded investors in a CDO ("AB-
ACUS 2007-AC1") by representing that a management group selected
the underlying RMBSs when, in reality, a hedge fund selected the
RMBSs and intended to take a short position against the portfolio.127
Additionally, the SEC alleged that Goldman Sachs represented that
the same hedge fund actually shorting 28 the portfolio was taking a
long position in the equity tranche.129 The SEC brought the action
under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, employing devices, schemes,
or artifices to defraud, 30 and Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act, employing devices, schemes, or artifices to
127. Complaint of Plaintiff at 11-12, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-03229 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr20lO-59.pdf.
128. A short position is the sale of a security with the belief that it will decrease in value while
a long position corresponds to an expected increase in value. Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortselling.asp#axzzlk34sOmJh (last visited Jan. 20,2012).
129. Complaint of Plaintiff, supra note 127, at 13.
130. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1)-(3) (2006).
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defraud and making untrue statements or omissions of material
facts.131 Goldman Sachs settled the suit three months after the SEC
filed it and Goldman paid the SEC $550 million, the largest penalty
ever levied against a bank.132 At the time of the settlement, Goldman
Sachs stated that it had made a "mistake" and acknowledged the use
of "incomplete information" while marketing the CDO.s33
Many previous CDO litigation actions have also alleged fraud in
one way or another.134 Although the fraud claims were not always
successful and, indeed, Goldman Sachs never explicitly admitted to
fraud, the concept has been a popular one in previous cases. While it
may be difficult to prove something like fraud, the Act could find a
limited calling in providing an easier means of recovery against a
bank. If fleshed out, the risk retention requirements, specifically if a
determination of exactly what kind of risk that banks must retain,
could provide a bright-line rule almost akin to strict liability that
would greatly aid plaintiffs. Whether this consequence would be ben-
eficial or desirable is a matter for debate. Additionally, questions
arise as to who would be eligible to bring such an action and what
would the plaintiffs be required to show. Further, would the CDO
have to lose value, and to what extent? Would it matter if the bank
could show that it otherwise attempted to comply with good practices
in the construction and issuance of the CDO? At this stage, encourag-
ing litigation based upon a risk-retention basis seems unwise.
Additional methods of preventing catastrophe besides the Act have
also been suggested. Some of these include clearinghouses similar to
those employed in commodities trading and industry-sponsored
"bailout pools" that would at least attempt to internalize risk within
the financial industry. 135 Additionally, insurance programs beyond
those already in place through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration have been suggested.136 One thought is that a program might
function like something loosely analogous to the Attorney's Liability
Assurance Society, of which many large U.S. law firms are mem-
131. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2009); Complaint of Plaintiff, supra note 127, at 19-21.
132. Patricia Hurtado & Christine Harper, SEC Settlement with Goldman Sachs for $550 Mil-




134. Debussy LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 242 Fed. Appx. 735 (2d Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Daniel
Boone Area Sch. Dist. v. Lehman Bros., 187 F. Supp. 2d 400, 403 (W.D. Pa. 2002).
135. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit Crisis and Failure (Part I), 104 Nw.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 398, 413 (2010).
136. Id. at 412.
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bers.13 7 Many of these novel ideas have a common theme: they would
involve a certain degree of self-regulation. Indeed, at this time, many
ideas like these seem to be attempting to strike a delicate balance with
those contained in the Act. While many are loathe to permit the
banks continue policing themselves, as the failure of self-regulation
culminated in an abject catastrophe, there remains the sneaking suspi-
cion that government regulations cannot, will not, or could not accom-
plish any meaningful changes to the system. The compromise that
must be found between these positions will obviously involve a signifi-
cant debate, one much beyond anything found in the Act.
V. CONCLUSION
Like many pieces of legislation, unfortunately, the Act is reactive,
not proactive. Congress is playing catch-up to a system that was de-
signed to operate in a fashion that, while not illegal or fraudulent,
often takes a liberal reading of legislation that comes its way. If the
risk-retention requirements of the Act are merely designed to prevent
a future crisis of the nature that Wall Street recently experienced, they
may achieve this narrow goal. If Congress truly aims to "reform" the
financial industry, as the title suggests, this loftier goal will almost cer-
tainly fail if left to the rules in the Act. True reformation of an indus-
try that is so vital and central to everyday life will not come from a
piece of legislation such as this. The concerns it seeks to address have
been learned the hard way and the system will adapt without the legis-
lation, for better or worse. The role that CDOs will play in the future
is unclear, but it is very unlikely that the banks will construct and issue
the CDOs in the same manner that they constructed them during the
past decade. If the old saying "change must come from within" was
ever appropriate, now appears to be a time to apply it. The risk reten-
tion requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act are a good starting point for
a serious discussion of what changes need to be made and in what
fashion, but if it is a bill to actually "reform" the financial industry, it
fails at this ambitious and lofty goal.
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